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Abstract. We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential
economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination
of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann [3]).
In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in between
autarchy and (constrained) optimality, there exists an equilibrium at which
social welfare attains that value. Our method consists in restoring Welfare
Theorems for a weak notion of (constrained) optimality. The latter, inspired
by Malinvaud [17], corresponds to the absence of Pareto improving feasible
redistributions over (however long) ¯nite horizons, along with some limited
validity of social transversality.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a large class of sequential economies with limited
commitment over an in¯nite horizon under uncertainty. Asset markets are sequen-
tially complete and endogenous solvency constraints prevent debt repudiation at
equilibrium. In particular, as in Kehoe and Levine [12], Kocherlakota [14] and Al-
varez and Jermann [3], traders might only borrow up to the point at which they
are indi®erent between honoring their debt obligations and reverting to permanent
autarchy. The notion of competitive equilibrium is inherited from Alvarez and Jer-
mann [3]. Accordingly, debt limits are taken as given by individuals and they are
the largest values such that repayment is always individually rational (i.e., they are
not-too-tight).
A relevant feature of equilibria with not-too-tight debt constraints is that they
may be (constrained) ine±cient. This happens when the equilibrium price sequence
involves low enough interest rates. In particular, the autarchic allocation can always
be decentralized as an equilibrium and it is (constrained) ine±cient when the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption of unconstrained
individuals is su±ciently low.
Another (perhaps less known) feature of equilibrium with not-too-tight debt
constraints is that it might be indeterminate. A classic example is the stationary
symmetric two-agent economy with cyclic individual endowments (similar to an
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1example provided by Bewley [7], recently elaborated in the limited commitment
framework by Azariadis [5]). In this economy, autarchy is (constrained) ine±cient
when the high-endowment is relatively large with respect to the low-endowment,
that is, when agents are very far from consumption smoothing in the absence of
¯nancial markets. In this case, there exists a unique (constrained) e±cient equi-
librium di®erent from autarchy, allowing agents to get as close as possible to con-
sumption smoothing, and a continuum of (constrained) ine±cient non-stationary
equilibrium allocations converging to autarchy. This type of examples suggests that
there is a tight relation between ine±ciency and indeterminacy.
We show that this conjecture can be made a precise statement (and can formally
be proved) in the following sense. Given any arbitrary social welfare value in
between autarchy and (constrained) optimality, there exists an equilibrium with
not-too-tight debt constraints at which social welfare attains that value. In other
terms, there is a continuum of equilibria with welfare declining from (constrained)
e±ciency to autarchy.
We adapt the canonical method based on Welfare Theorems to characterize the
set of competitive equilibria. In particular, we introduce a weak form of (con-
strained) optimality. Weak optimality requires the simultaneous achievement of
two conditions: Malinvaud (or short-run) optimality and contraction-proofness.
The former corresponds to the absence of a feasible welfare-improving reallocation
restricted to a ¯nite number of periods (as in Malinvaud [17, 18], Balasko and Shell
[6] and Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [2]). More intuitively, it is achieved
when allocations satisfy the canonical ¯rst-order conditions, or Euler equations,
for a social planner problem, though a social condition of transversality might fail.
Contraction-proofness, instead, imposes the absence of feasible welfare improve-
ments by means of simple redistributions, consisting of a reallocation of current
consumptions in a given period, possibly contingent on some event, and a uniform
contraction of trades in the following periods. This criterion of optimality is weak in
the sense that, whereas an e±cient allocation is always weakly optimal, ine±cient
allocations (autarchy included) may be weakly optimal. The next step is to show
that any equilibrium is a weak optimum (First Welfare Theorem) and, conversely,
any weak optimum can be sustained as an equilibrium for some balanced distri-
bution of initial assets (Second Welfare Theorem). Weak optima, in turn, can be
generated as limits of solutions to arti¯cial social planner problems under the re-
strictions imposed by the notion of short-run optimality and contraction-proofness.
In fact, this approximation method allows us to prove that there exists a large set
of weakly optimal allocations with social welfare declining from (constrained) opti-
mality to autarchy. By Welfare Theorems, this structure is inherited by the set of
equilibrium allocations under limited commitment. Hence, equilibria are globally
indeterminate. Limited commitment produces an unavoidable fragility of ¯nancial
markets, leading to a complete collapse (autarchy).
Indeterminacy of equilibria might be understood as the consequence of a dynamic
complementarity between current and expected future credit constraints. When
individuals expect a fall in future debt limits (i.e., they believe to be less likely to
smooth out consumption through asset markets), the current value of participation
goes down and incentives to default increase. Since current debt limits adjust
endogenously to market conditions, they fall immediately as a response to lower
participation incentives (or a loss of reputation). Indeterminacy is produced by a
2failure of social transversality (i.e., low implied interest rates), as in overlapping
generations economies, where a change in expectations might lead to a contraction
of trades (across generations) and a convergence to autarchy. The relation between
indeterminacy and ine±ciency is there controversial (see, for instance, Kehoe and
Levine [11]).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 and 3, we lay out the fundamen-
tals of a general multi-agent economy with uncertainty and we de¯ne a notion of
competitive equilibrium with sequential trades and not-too-tight debt constraints.
In section 4, we present our Indeterminacy Theorem. In section 5, we introduce
weak e±ciency and provide a partial characterization of weak optima. In section
6, we prove the First and the Second Welfare Theorem with respect of this notion
of weak e±ciency. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Fundamentals
2.1. Time and uncertainty. Time and uncertainty are represented by an event-
tree S, a countably in¯nite set, endowed with ordering º. For a date-event ¾ in S,
t(¾) in T = f0;1;2;:::;t;:::g denotes its date and
¾+ = f¿ 2 S (¾) : t(¿) = t(¾) + 1g
is the non-empty ¯nite set of all immediate direct successors, where
S (¾) = f¿ 2 S : ¿ º ¾g
is the set of all date-events ¿ in S (weakly) following date-event ¾ in S. The initial
date-event is Á in S, with t(Á) = 0, that is, ¾ º Á for every ¾ in S; the initial
date-event in S (¾) is ¾ in S. This construction is canonical (Debreu [10, Chapter
7]).
2.2. Vector spaces. We essentially adhere to Aliprantis and Border [1, Chapters
5-8] for terminology and notation. The reference vector space is L = RS, the space
of all real-valued maps on S, with typical element
v = (v¾)¾2S :
The vector space L is endowed with the canonical order: an element v on L is
positive if v¾ ¸ 0 for every ¾ in S; it is strictly positive if v¾ > 0 for every ¾ in
S; ¯nally, it is uniformly strictly positive if, for some ² > 0, v¾ ¸ ² for every ¾ in
S. For a positive element v of L, we simply write v ¸ 0 and, when v in L is also
non-null, v > 0. Finally, the positive cone of any (Riesz) vector subspace F of L is
fv 2 F : v ¸ 0g.
For an element v of L, v+ in L and v¡ in L are, respectively, its positive part




j2J of elements of L, its supremum and its in¯mum in











3it is eventually vanishing if f¾ 2 S : jv¾j > 0g is a ¯nite subset of S. The (Riesz)
vector subspace of L, consisting of all eventually vanishing elements v of L, is
denoted by C. Finally, unless otherwise explicitly stated, the vector space L is
endowed with the product topology.
2.3. Individuals. There is a ¯nite set J of individuals. For every individual i in
J, the consumption space Xi is the positive cone of the commodity space L. A con-
sumption plan xi in Xi is interior (respectively, bounded) if it is uniformly strictly
positive (respectively, bounded). An allocation is a distribution of consumption
plans across individuals. The space of allocations is
X =
©
x 2 LJ : xi 2 Xi for every i 2 J
ª
:
An allocation x in X is interior (respectively, bounded) if every consumption plan
xi in Xi is interior (respectively, bounded).
2.4. Endowments. For every individual i in J, the endowment ei in Xi is interior
and bounded. In particular, there exists a su±ciently small 1 > ² > 0 satisfying,













This hypothesis imposes a uniform lower bound on the endowment of individuals
and, across individuals, an upper bound on the aggregate endowment.
2.5. Preferences. For every individual i in J, the per-period utility function ui :
R+ ! R is bounded, continuous, continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. (As far as smoothness is concerned, more precisely, the per-period
utility function is continuously di®erentiable on R++.) For every individual i in J,












where ¼i is a strictly positive summable element of L. Also, for any date-event ¾

















This is the continuation utility beginning from date-event ¾ in S.
2.6. Uniform impatience. We impose a uniform bound on the marginal rate
of substitution of perpetual future consumption for current consumption. This
hypothesis implies a uniform form of impatience across individuals and date-events.
Basically, there exists a su±ciently small 1 > ´ > 0 satisfying, for every individual







42.7. (Weak) Inada conditions. This additional hypothesis serves to ensure in-
teriority. For every individual i in J, at every date-event ¾ in S,






where 1 > ² > 0 is given by the bounds on endowments and 1 > ´ > 0 by the
hypothesis of uniform impatience.
2.8. Subjective prices. At an interior consumption plan xi in Xi, the subjective













The subjective price pi in Pi is a strictly positive summable element of L.
2.9. Feasible allocations. An allocation x in X is feasible if it exhausts aggregate

















The space of all feasible allocations is denoted by X (e). Notice that feasibility
re°ects both material constraints and participation constraints.
Under the maintained assumptions on preferences and endowments, every fea-
sible allocation is, as a matter of fact, an interior allocation. The particular form
of (weak) Inada conditions, which is a joint restriction on preferences and endow-
ments, guarantees interiority of consumptions, subject to participation constraints,
avoiding unbounded per-period utilities and, hence, simplifying the presentation.
Lemma 1 (Interiority). Every feasible allocation is interior.
3. Equilibrium
Trade occurs sequentially. In every period of trade, contingent on revealed uncer-
tainty, a full spectrum of elementary Arrow securities is available, yielding unitary
payo®s in the following period of trade, contingent on the occurrence of events.
The asset market is, thus, sequentially complete. It simpli¯es to represent implicit
prices of contingent commodities in terms of present values. They are denoted by
p in P, the space of all strictly positive elements of L. At every date-event ¾ in S,
a portfolio, with deliveries v in L at the following date-events, has a market value,






An individual i in J participates into ¯nancial markets. The holding of securities
is represented by a ¯nancial plan vi in V i, the space of all unrestricted elements
of L. Positive values correspond to claims, whereas negative values are liabilities.
This participation occurs subject to sequential budget constraints, imposing, at












5Accumulated wealth serves to ¯nance current consumption, in excess to current
endowment, and current net asset positions (claims or liabilities). Participation into
¯nancial markets is further restricted by quantitative limits to private liabilities.
These debt limits are given by fi in Fi, the set of all positive and bounded elements
of L. Individual i in J can issue debt obligations subject to debt constraints given,




From the perspective of the individual, these debt limits are given exogenously.
As in Kehoe and Levine [12], Kocherlakota [14] and Alvarez and Jermann [3],
commitment is limited. Individuals might not honor their debt obligations, even
though the material availability of future endowments would su±ce for a complete
repayment. When debt is repudiated, assets are seized and the individual is ex-
cluded from future participation into ¯nancial markets, though maintaining claims
into future uncertain endowment. Thus, unhonored debt induces a permanent re-
verse to autarchy. At equilibrium, debt limits serve to guarantee that, on the one
side, debt repudiation is not pro¯table for individuals and, on the other side, the
maximum sustainable development of ¯nancial markets is enforced. This is the
notion of equilibrium with not-too-tight debt constraints provided by Alvarez and
Jermann [3].
Formally, an allocation x in X is an equilibrium allocation if there exist a price p
in P, debt limits f in F and ¯nancial plans v in V satisfying the following properties:
(a) For every individual i in J, the plan
¡
xi;vi¢
in Xi £V i is optimal subject
to budget and debt constraints, given initial claims, that is, it maximizes




















given initial wealth vi
Á in R.










(c) For every individual i in J, debt limits are not-too-tight, that is, at every









































6given initial wealth ¡fi
¹ ¾ in R. (By convention, the supremum over an empty
set is negative in¯nity.)





















Hence, an equilibrium allocation x in X is, as a matter of fact, an element of X (e),
the space of feasible allocations.
We adopt a restrictive notion of equilibrium: ¯rst, we require debt limits to
be positive and bounded; second, we exclude speculative bubbles. Negative debt
limits, that are allowed by Alvarez and Jermann [3], would impose to individuals
the holding of positive wealth along some contingencies, an unnatural requirement
in our view. Kocherlakota [15] shows some properties of homogeneity of the budget
set. Negative and unbounded debt limits would sustain speculative bubbles at
equilibrium. Also, notice that, at equilibrium, for every individual i in J, debt
limits fi in Fi need be consistent (according to the terminology borne out by








Hence, the maximum amount of debt can be sustained by means of current endow-
ment and by issuing future debt up the maximum amount.
4. Indeterminacy
Debt contracts are enforced by the threat of exclusion from ¯nancial markets and
might sustain some limited risk-sharing at equilibrium. However, the underlying
mechanism is merely reputational and, in a sense, fragile. Competitive equilibrium
is indeterminate.
We relate multiplicity of equilibria to social welfare. Given welfare weights µ in

















E±cient values obtain when the planner maximizes social welfare subject to feasi-





Clearly, when autarchy is ine±cient, W¤
µ > Wµ (e) for all welfare weights µ in £.
Indeterminacy Theorem. Given welfare weights µ in £, for any arbitrary value
» in ¥ = [0;1], there exists an equilibrium allocation x in X (e) with social welfare
satisfying
Wµ (x) = »W ¤
µ + (1 ¡ »)Wµ (e):
7Welfare weights account for a merely distributive multiplicity, typically re°ecting
the allocation of initial claims inherited from the unrepresented past. The index » in
¥, instead, measures the degree of market con¯dence, or of market soundness, or of
credit expansion, decreasing from the maximum sustainable development of ¯nan-
cial markets (e±ciency) to the complete collapse of ¯nancial markets (autarchy).
Equilibrium exhibits a global form of indeterminacy. Though debt limits are gen-
erated by fundamentals, by means of participation constraints, ¯nancial fragility is
an intrinsically unavoidable phenomenon.
To prove the Indeterminacy Theorem, we amend the classical method of analysis
that exploits Welfare Theorems. In particular, we introduce a weak form of e±-
ciency. This requires the absence of welfare-improving feasible redistributions over
¯nite horizons only, along with a limited validitity of social transversality. We then
show that weakly e±cient allocations form a large set, with social welfare decreas-
ing from e±ciency to autarchy. We ¯nally prove that any equilibrium allocation is
weakly e±cient (First Welfare Theorem) and that any weakly e±cient allocation
emerges as an equilibrium allocation for some distribution of initial claims across
individuals (Second Welfare Theorem). As a matter of fact, the multiplicity of weak
optima re°ects upon competitive equilibrium.
5. Weak Optima
5.1. Malinvaud e±ciency. Malinvaud e±ciency is inherited from studies on cap-
ital theory (e.g., Malinvaud [17, 18]) and overlapping generations economies (e.g.,
Balasko and Shell [6]). The canonical notion of Pareto e±ciency requires the ab-
sence of a welfare improvement, subject to material and participation constraints.
Thus, an allocation x in X (e) is Pareto e±cient if it is not Pareto dominated
by an alternative allocation z in X (e). The notion of Malinvaud e±ciency, in-
stead, imposes weaker restrictions, as it simply requires the absence of a welfare
improvement, subject to material and participation constraints, only over any ¯nite
(however long) horizon. Consistently, an allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud e±cient
if it is not Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in X (e) \ C (x), where
C (x) =
(
z 2 X :
X
i2J
¯ ¯zi ¡ xi¯ ¯ 2 C
)
is the set of all allocations z in X that modify allocation x in X only over a ¯nite
horizon. (Remember that C is the set of all v in L such that f¾ 2 S : jv¾j > 0g is
¯nite.) Clearly, any Pareto optimum is a Malinvaud optimum. However, Malinvaud
optimality is a largely weaker requirement: for instance, any autarchic allocation
is a Malinvaud optimum.
Malinvaud e±ciency admits a characterization in terms of supporting price. This
is an elaboration on the common duality argument, developed in the literature
on capital theory and, more recently, for economies of overlapping generations by
Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw [2]. The (algebraic) dual of the vector subspace
C of L can be identi¯ed with L itself, under the duality operation given, for every
(v;f) in C £ L, by




8Lemma 2 (First-order conditions). An allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud e±cient
if and only if there exists a price p in P satisfying, at every allocation z in X¤ (e)\









where X¤ (e) is the set of all allocations z in X such that, for every individual i in










Equivalently, an allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud e±cient if and only if there




















































where pi in Pi is the subjective price at interior consumption plan xi in Xi.
Restriction (s) coincides with an admittedly abstract characterization of Malin-
vaud optima in terms of supporting positive linear functionals, whereas conditions
(c-1)-(c-2) uncover an equivalent formulation in terms of more treatable ¯rst-order
conditions. For the sake of simplicity, the above characterization might be inter-
preted as referring to a canonical social planner problem. Restrictions (c-1)-(c-2)
correspond, in this analogy, to the Euler equations induced by the maximization
of (weighted) social welfare subject to material constraints and to participation
constraints. They basically rule out the circumstance of a constrained individual
exhibiting a marginal rate of substitution strictly above the marginal rate of substi-
tution of an unconstrained individual. This, indeed, would expose to an arbitrage
opportunity, as a substitution of future consumption for current consumption of
the unconstrained individual, balanced by the opposite substitution for the con-
strained individual, would not violate participation constraint, as utility of the
unconstrained individual is strictly above the autarchic utility, and would produce
a welfare improvement. The remarkable implication of this full characterization
is that a Malinvaud optimum does not impose any restriction in terms of social
transversality or, alternatively, does not rule out any arbitrage opportunity at in-
¯nitum. A substitution of current consumption for perpetual future consumption
might still generate a welfare improvement, subject to feasibility.
5.2. Contraction-proofness. We here identify additional restrictions in terms of
e±ciency. These correspond to some limited validity of social transversality and,
apparently, are independent of conditions that rule out short-period arbitrages,
entailed by Malinvaud e±ciency. Basically, we require the absence of feasible welfare
improvements by means of simple redistributions, consisting of a reallocation of
current consumptions, at some date-event, and a uniform contraction of trades in
the following date-events.
9An allocation x in X (e) is contraction-proof if, given any 1 > ¯ > 0, it is
not Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in X (e) satisfying, for some
date-event ¾ in S,
z¿ = x¿; at every date-event ¿ 2 (S=S (¾));
and
z¿ = ¯x¿ + (1 ¡ ¯)e¿; at every non-initial date-event ¿ 2 S (¾):
Thus, the allocation is only modi¯ed, beginning from some contingency along the
in¯nite horizon, through an arbitrary redistribution of current consumptions and
an uniform reduction of trades in the remote future.
The property of contraction-proofness admits a very elementary characteriza-
tion in terms of subjective prices (or marginal utilities) of individuals. This es-
sentially demands that, contingent on any date-event, the subjectively-evaluated
¯rst-order welfare e®ect, in terms of current consumption, of a permanent rever-
sion to autarchy be, in the aggregate, negative. This might not, in general, be
true for simply feasible allocations: when an individual is at the autarchic utility,
a movement towards the autarchy produces a ¯rst-order welfare increase by strict
convexity of preferences.
Lemma 3 (First-order conditions). An allocation x in X (e) is contraction-proof

















where, for every individual i in J, pi in Pi is the subjective price at interior con-
sumption plan xi in Xi.
5.3. Weak e±ciency. To simplify the presentation, we introduce a notion of weak
optimality, encompassing the absence of welfare-improving reallocations over ¯nite
horizons, along with a limited validity of social transversality. Hence, an allocation
x in X (e) is weakly e±cient if it is Malinvaud e±cient and contraction-proof. No-
tice that this terminology is inconsistent with Balasko and Shell [6], where weak
e±ciency is identi¯ed with Malinvaud e±ciency alone.
5.4. Multiplicity. We here provide a partial characterization of weak optima. In
particular, we prove that there exists a continuum of such optima with social welfare
decreasing from Pareto e±ciency to autarchy. (Obviously, when the autarchy is
Pareto e±cient, this multiplicity disappears.) Weak optima are parameterized by
welfare weights µ in £ and an index » in ¥ = [0;1] measuring the failure of Pareto
optimality. Hence, the set of weak optima contains a set that is isomorphic to
£ £ ¥.
Proposition 1 (Multiplicity). Given welfare weights µ in £, for any arbitrary
value » in ¥ = [0;1], there exists a weakly e±cient allocation x in X (e) with social
welfare satisfying
(*) Wµ (x) = »W ¤
µ + (1 ¡ »)Wµ (e):
The di±culty for the understanding of the structure of weak optima stems from
the fact that they cannot be directly obtained as solutions of a well-de¯ned so-
cial planning programme. This notwithstanding, a very simple characterization
10emerges by means of arti¯cial truncated planner problems, along with a limit argu-
ment. These truncations obtain by imposing additional restrictions on the amount
of redistributed resources that can be implemented out of some ¯nite horizon. For
a given truncation, the severity of these additional restrictions determines the value
of the social planner problem: under the most severe restrictions, the redistribu-
tion vanishes out of a ¯nite horizon and, hence, the autarchy is the only feasible
allocation (indeed, a decrease of consumption in the last period of the truncation
cannot be compensated by an increase of consumption in the following periods
and, hence, by induction, no redistribution is the only feasible policy); under the
least severe restrictions, any feasible allocation can be implemented and, hence,
a Pareto optimum obtains. It follows that, for any given truncation, some prop-
erly chosen degree of severity of additional constraints would yield a given social
welfare in between autarchy and Pareto e±ciency. Taking the limit over ¯nite hori-
zons, a limit allocation emerges with a given social welfare value (as this can be
assumed to be constant along the sequence). This limit allocation is Malinvaud
e±cient and contraction-proof. Basically, this occurs because, as the ¯nite horizon
extends along the sequence of truncations, ¯rst-order conditions are satis¯ed along
larger and larger horizons. We remark that other forms of truncations are practica-
ble and would deliver analogous conclusions: for instance, adding restrictions only
beginning from some contingency or, in a Markov representation of uncertainty,
conditional on some current state only. Moreover, we believe that an analogous
method could prove it applicable in other economies exhibiting a failure of social
transversality (for instance, for a global characterization of competitive equilibria
in economies of overlapping generations).
6. Welfare Theorems
We here show equivalence between equilibrium allocations and weakly e±cient
allocations. Indeed, any equilibrium allocation is weakly e±cient (First Welfare
Theorem) and any weakly e±cient allocation emerges as an equilibrium allocation
for some balanced distribution of initial claims (Second Welfare Theorem). As
a matter of fact, we prove that Malinvaud e±ciency and contraction-proofness
exhaust all restrictions on equilibrium prices and allocations.
Proposition 2 (First Welfare Theorem). Any equilibrium allocation is weakly ef-
¯cient.
The First Welfare Theorem is almost immediate. Indeed, ¯rst-order conditions
for a Malinvaud optimum coincides with those for an equilibrium under limited
commitment (see Alvarez and Jermann [3]). At equilibrium, the marginal rate of
substitution of an individual falls below the market rate of substitution only if this
individual is constrained in issuing further debt obligations, for otherwise a budget-
balanced (marginal) substitution of future consumption for current consumption
would yield an increase in welfare. Furthermore, contraction-proofness need be
satis¯ed at equilibrium: if not, a perpetual contraction of asset accumulation be-
ginning from some date-event, along with a proportional perpetual reduction of net
trades in order to balance sequential budget, would allow for a welfare-improving
increase in current consumption, thus violating optimality of consumption and ¯-
nancial plans at equilibrium. Notice that this unreversed arbitrage might not be
feasible if individuals are constrained to accumulate positive amounts of wealth
(that is, if debt limits are not positive).
11Proposition 3 (Second Welfare Theorem). Any weakly e±cient allocation is an
equilibrium allocation.
The proof of the Second Welfare Theorem cannot rely on a traditional separation
argument alone. Indeed, separation yields potential equilibrium prices ful¯lling
¯rst-order conditions (lemma 2). Such prices, however, might not belong to the
dual of the commodity space (restricted by the aggregate endowment) and, thus,
might not deliver a well-de¯ned intertemporal accounting. In order to provide their
Second Welfare Theorem for Pareto e±cient allocations, Alvarez and Jermann [3]
assume that prices belong to the dual of the (restricted) commodity space (the
hypothesis of high implied interest rates) and recover ¯nancial plans at equilibrium
as the present value of future contingent net trades. We cannot count on this simple
method and need an alternative argument. Furthermore, di®erently from Alvarez
and Jermann [3], as well as from Kocherlakota [15], we impose positivity of debt
limits (individuals cannot be restricted to hold positive amounts of wealth along
the in¯nite horizon), which poses additional di±culties.
To recover ¯nancial plans, we move from a basic observation. Using subjective
prices (marginal utilities), intertemporal accounting is well-de¯ned. Furthermore,
because of ¯rst-order restrictions, the subjectively-evaluated present value of net
trades imposes an upper bound on the amount of wealth held at equilibrium and, in
addition, this upper bound is negative when the individual is at the autarchic utility.
Also, by contraction-proofness, the sum of these upper bounds need be positive,
which is the only place where that hypothesis plays a role in the proof. As ¯nancial
plans need be balanced at equilibrium across individuals, the negative of the sum of
the subjective upper bounds poses a lower bound to ¯nancial plans at equilibrium.
Hence, having identi¯ed a suitable interval for ¯nancial plans, we can construct
an adjustment process that increases debt, when more debt is budget-feasible, and
decreases debt, when outstanding debt is budget-unfeasible. This process admits a
¯xed point and, at the ¯xed point, sequential budget constraints are balanced and
¯nancial markets clear.
Optimality of consumption plans, subject to budget constraints and debt con-
straints, is ensured by ¯rst-order conditions at a Malinvaud optimum. Hence, it
only remains to reconstruct suitable debt limits. Here, we follow Alvarez and Jer-
mann [3]. When an individual is at the autarchic utility, outstanding debt coincides
with the maximum amount of debt. When an individual is not at the autarchic
utility, we compute the maximum amount of sustainable debt, which depends on
the future contingent plan for debt limits. Beginning with su±ciently large debt
limits, this process of adjustment generates a decreasing sequence of debt limits
and, in the limit, we obtain not-too-tight debt constraints. The identi¯cation of
suitable upper bounds requires some elaboration.
7. Conclusion
We have shown that equilibria of economies with limited enforcement and not-
too-tight debt limits are indeterminate. In particular, we have developed a method
that exploits Welfare Theorems for deriving a full characterization of equilibria.
These theorems are established for a notion of weak optimality, corresponding to
the absence of a feasible Pareto improving redistribution over a ¯nite number of time
periods, jointly with a speci¯c social transversality (contraction-proofness). Weak
optima, in turn, are characterized by means of sequences of planning objectives
12with limited amounts of redistributions in the long-run. This method shows that, at
equilibrium, social welfare ranges from two extreme outcomes: constrained Pareto
optimality and autarchy.
This paper bears very important consequences on the understanding of the type
of equilibria that may emerge in economies where contract enforcement is limited
and the no default option is implemented by imposing individual speci¯c debt con-
straints. In particular, these equilibria su®er from a severe form of ¯nancial fragility:
a change in expectations at any given equilibrium, where asset trades guarantee an
optimal amount of consumption smoothing across states and time periods, might
generate a contraction of net trades, in some cases leading to ¯nancial collapse.
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13Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. At a feasible allocation, for every individual i in J, partici-



























































which produces a uniformly strictly positive lower bound on consumptions. ¤
Proof of lemma 2. Su±ciency of a supporting price p in P (i.e., condition (s))
for Malinvaud e±ciency is obvious, as it is proved by the traditional argument for
the canonical First Welfare Theorem. Therefore, we show that restrictions (c-1)-
(c-2) imply condition (s). Consider any alternative allocation z in X¤ (e) \ C (x)
and suppose that, for some individual i in J,































Notice that vi is an element of C. A simple decomposition yields, at every date-
















Furthermore, notice that convexity of preferences and participation constraints im-
ply that, at every date-event ¾ in S,
vi













Therefore, restrictions (c-1)-(c-2), along with inequality (*), guarantee that, at












































thus proving the claim.
Assume now that the allocation x in X (e) is Malinvaud-e±cient and de¯ne a

















This price p in P obviously satis¯es condition (c-1). The necessity of condition
(c-2) straightforwardly obtains by means of the argument in Alvarez and Jermann
[3, Proposition 3.1]. As conditions (c-1)-(c-2) imply restriction (s), this completes
the proof. ¤
Proof of lemma 3. Assume that the allocation x in X (e) is not contraction-
proof. Hence, at some date-event ¾ in S, there exists a feasible welfare improvement,
subject to additional restrictions, and strict Pareto dominance involves no loss of
generality. Observe that, by concavity, for every individual i in J,





























Summing across individuals, after dividing by subjective prices, yields g¾ < 0. For
the converse implication, suppose that g¾ < 0 at some date-event ¾ in S. For
some su±ciently large 1 > ¯ > 0, construct an alternative allocation on S (¾) (the
allocation is unaltered at all date-events ¿ in (S=S (¾))). At the initial date-event
¾ in S (¾),
yi
¾ = xi






+ (1 ¡ ¯)
¡
gi
¾ ¡ ¹ g¾
¢
;























at any other date-event ¿ in S (¾),
yi
¿ = ¯xi
¿ + (1 ¡ ¯)ei
¿:
For any su±ciently large 1 > ¯ > 0, this allocation is balanced and satis¯es par-
ticipation constraints at all non-initial date-events ¿ in S (¾) by convexity of pref-





















+ (1 ¡ ¯)pi
¾gi
¾ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)pi
¾¹ g¾ =
¡(1 ¡ ¯)pi
¾¹ g¾ > 0:
This proves the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 1. The proof is decomposed in several separate steps. First,
we construct a sequence of truncated planner problems, by adding additional aux-
iliary constraints on the transfers across individuals; truncated optima exist and,
at given welfare weights µ in £, social welfare might be measured by » in ¥ by con-
trolling for the severity of additional constraints on transfers. Second, we generate
a sequence of truncated optima, maintaining a constant value of social welfare, and
we consider the limit allocation of these truncated planner problems. Third, we
prove that the limit allocation is in fact a Malinvaud optimum. Fourth, we show
that the limit allocation also satis¯es contraction-proofness.




















where, for every t in T ,
St = f¾ 2 S : t(¾) · tg:
Constraints are given as a continuous correspondence of ² in R+ with non-empty
convex and compact values. (Indeed, notice that the map x 7! jxj is convex. In






(x ¡ e) 2 X (e)
satis¯es constraints (y) at ²¤ in R+.) Hence, by the Maximum Theorem, the max-
imum is achieved and the value function is continuous in ² in R+.
Observe that, when ² in R+ is su±ciently large, the truncated problem delivers
a Pareto e±cient allocation; when ² in R+ vanishes, the truncated problem delivers
the autarky, as this is the only feasible allocation x in X (e) satisfying additional
constraints (y). Hence, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, restriction (*) is sat-
is¯ed by some value of ² in R+. Let xt be an allocation in X (e) that solves the
t-truncated planner problem at the value of ² in R+ ful¯lling restriction (*). ¤
Limit. The sequence of allocation fxtgt2T in X (e), at no loss of generality, con-
verges to some allocation x in X (e) in the product topology. Also, by continuity
of preferences, restriction (*) is satis¯ed by the limit allocation x in X (e). ¤
16Malinvaud optimality in the limit. We show that the limit allocation x in X is Ma-
linvaud e±cient. To this purpose, suppose that it is Pareto dominated by an alter-
native allocation z in X (e)\C (x). For every individual i in J, let Fi be the ¯nite















For every su±ciently small 1 > ¸ > 0, the allocation x + ¸(z ¡ x) lies in X (e)
and Pareto dominates allocation x in X (e) by strict convexity of preferences. In
particular, by strict convexity of preferences, for every individual i in J, at every












For every su±ciently large t in T , the allocation xt+¸(z ¡ x) lies in X (e). Indeed,
balancedness follows by construction; participation constraints are insured by con-








additional restrictions (y) are satis¯ed in every t-truncated planner problem along
the sequence for every su±ciently large t in T . This yields a contradiction. ¤
Contraction-proofness in the limit. In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that
allocation x in X (e) is not contraction-proof. Thus, it is strictly Pareto dominated
by an alternative allocation z in X (e) satisfying, given 1 > ¯ > 0, for some date-
event ¾ in S,
z¿ = x¿; at every date-event ¿ 2 (S=S (¾));
and
z¿ = ¯x¿ + (1 ¡ ¯)e¿; at every non-initial date-event ¿ 2 S (¾):




¿; at every date-event ¿ 2 (S=S (¾));
zt
¿ = ¯xt
¿ + (1 ¡ ¯)e¿; at every non-initial date-event ¿ 2 S (¾);
and
zt
¾ = z¾; at the initial date-event ¾ 2 S (¾):
This allocation zt lies in X (e) and Pareto dominates allocation xt in X (e) for
every su±ciently large t in T . Indeed, it is balanced by construction and it satis¯es
participation constraints. In addition, it satis¯es the additional constraints (y) in
the t-truncated planner problem for all su±ciently large t in T , as ¾ lies in St. This
yields a contradiction. ¤
The sequence of steps proves the proposition. ¤
Proof of proposition 2. Using lemma 2, Malinvaud e±ciency follows from the
simple ¯rst-order characterization of equilibrium that is provided by Alvarez and
Jermann [3, Propositions 4.5-4.6]. Hence, in order to obtain a contradiction, sup-
pose that allocation x in X (e) is not contraction-proof. Thus, for some 1 > ¯ > 0,
17it is strictly Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in X (e) satisfying, for
some date-event ¹ ¾ in S,
z¿ = x¿; at every date-event ¿ 2 (S=S (¹ ¾));
and
z¿ = ¯x¿ + (1 ¡ ¯)e¿; at every non-initial date-event ¿ 2 S (¹ ¾):




¿; at every date-event ¿ 2 (S=S (¹ ¾));
wi
¹ ¾ = vi




¿; at every non-initial date-event ¿ 2 S (¹ ¾):






(Notice that this crucially depends on positivity of debt limits.) Budget constraint























Hence, by individual optimality at equilibrium, at date-event ¹ ¾ in S, budget con-





¿ + p¹ ¾
¡
zi







¿ + p¹ ¾
¡
zi




¹ ¾ = p¹ ¾vi
¹ ¾:



























and, by market clearing, X
i2J
vi = 0:
This yields a contraction, so proving the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 3. The proof is rather involved, so that we decompose it
in several steps.
Recovering ¯nancial plans. To simplify notation, we introduce the positive linear























18Notice that, by uniform impatience, gi is a bounded element of L. By ¯rst-order



















Finally, de¯ne g =
P
i2J gi and observe that, by contraction-proofness (see lemma
3), g is a positive bounded element of L.





The set H is non-empty, convex and compact (in the product topology). De¯ne a
correspondence f : H ! H by means of


















Basically, if a ¯nancial plan lies in the interior of the budget constraint at some
date-event, current debt is increased. By construction, given any h in H, at every


























As the correspondence f : H ! H is closed with non-empty convex values, by
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, it admits a ¯xed point h in H. At a ¯xed point,


















































To conclude, for every individual i in J, the ¯nancial plan vi = gi ¡ hi in V i is


















We treat such ¯nancial plans as given in the remaining parts of this proof. ¤
19Individual optimality. For every individual i in J, consider the set of all date-events
at which this individual is at the autarchic utility, that is,
Si =
©









Also, de¯ne the space Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
of all debt limits fi in Fi satisfying, at every








We here show that consumption plan xi in Xi is optimal, subject to budget and
debt constraints, given initial claims, at all debt limits fi in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
.

























Furthermore, considering any alternative budget feasible consumption plan zi in











































































































For every t in T , let
St = f¾ 2 S : t(¾) = tg and St = f¾ 2 S : t(¾) · tg:
































where the last inequality follows from debt constraints. By concavity of utility, this
su±ces to prove optimality, as the right hand-side vanishes in the limit, because pi
in Pi is a summable element of L and vi + fi is a bounded element of L. ¤






be the set of all plans
¡
¹ xi; ¹ vi¢
in Xi£V i satisfying, at every date-event




















given initial wealth wi










is non-empty at every ¹ ¾ 2 S
ª
½ V i £ Fi:






















It is straightforward to verify that this value function is well-de¯ned, as the max-
imum is achieved, and ful¯ls the following properties: (i) it is bounded; (ii) it is
concave; (iii) it is weakly increasing in fi in Fi and strictly increasing in wi in V i
on its domain Di; (iv) for every ¹ fi in Fi, it is continuous on the restricted domain
©¡
wi;fi¢
2 Di : fi = ¹ fiª
and upper hemicontinuous on the restricted domain
©¡
wi;fiª
2 Di : fi · ¹ fiª
;





is an element of the domain











We now show some properties of di®erentiability of the value function. Given
any fi in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢


















































By the well-known result in convex analysis, given any fi in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
, the value
function admits a (partial) derivative at
¡
vi;fi¢

















in Di satisfying, at some

































































21Also, by uniform impatience and boundedness of per-period utility, there exists a
































We shall exploit this fundamental inequality to recover debt limits.




by setting, at every

































































as utility satis¯es (weak) Inada conditions. Hence, by the Intermediate Value The-
orem, Gi ¡
fi¢



























































































































































is an element of Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
. Finally, observe that the operator


















We claim that Gi ¡ ¹ fi¢
in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
satis¯es Gi ¡ ¹ fi¢
· ¹ fi. Indeed, exploiting re-




Gi ¡ ¹ fi¢
¾ · ¡vi
¾ + Á · ¹ fi
¾;
at every date-event ¾ in Si,
Gi ¡ ¹ fi¢
¾ = ¡vi
¾ = ¹ fi
¾:
Now, by induction, construct a sequence
¡¡
Gi¢n ¡ ¹ fi¢¢
n2T in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
. Such a
sequence is weakly decreasing and bounded, as
¹ fi ¸
¡
Gi¢n ¡ ¹ fi¢
¸
¡
Gi¢n+1 ¡ ¹ fi¢
¸ ¡vi:
Hence, it converges to some fi in Fi ¡
xi;vi¢
in the product topology. By upper


























For every su±ciently large n in T ,
¡
Gi¢n+1 ¡ ¹ fi¢
¾ · fi










Gi¢n+1 ¡ ¹ fi¢
¾ ;
¡


















a contradiction. Hence, fi in Fi are not-too-tight debt limits at equilibrium. ¤
The proof is now complete. ¤
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